The political rhetoric around delimitation will continue to serve as a flashpoint, shaping poll strategies and deepening regional divides in the run-up to the 2026 Tamil Nadu election.
Southern states feel under-represented in national financial allocations and argue that representation should account for more than just population. Economic output, tax contributions and development indicators, they contend, should also be considered.
The process of delimitation in India is guided by the Constitution, which mandates periodic reallocation of parliamentary and state assembly constituencies based on population changes. Article 82 of the Constitution stipulates that after each Census, the allocation of seats in the Lok Sabha and state legislative assemblies should be readjusted to ensure proportional representation. Similarly, Article 170 governs the division of seats for state assemblies. This process is carried out by the Delimitation Commission, which is mandated to redraw constituency boundaries and determine scheduled caste/ tribe reserved seats based on demographic distribution.
Since Independence, India has conducted four major delimitation exercises. The first three in 1952, 1963, and 1973followed the censuses of 1951, 1961 and 1971, respectively. Each exercise adjusted the number of seats in the Lok Sabha and state assemblies in line with the population growth. The number of LS seats rose incrementally from 494 to 522, and finally 543 after 1971. The exercise also adjusted constituency boundaries to ensure equal representation per voter across states.
However, in 1976, the Indira Gandhi-led government imposed a freeze on the reallocation of seats through the 42nd Constitutional Amendment. The primary rationale was to encourage population control measures. This freeze was originally meant to last until 2001, but it was extended to 2026 through the 84th Constitutional Amendment in 2002. Now, as the freeze on seat reallocation nears its 2026 deadline, India faces the challenge of conducting a full-fledged delimitation exercise. The next Census originally scheduled for 2021 but delayed due to the Covid pandemic is expected to be the basis for this exercise.
While Article 82 mandates the reallocation of Lok Sabha seats after each Census to reflect demographic shifts, Article 81 imposes a cap of 550 seats; 530 for states and 20 for Union territories. Consequently, any expansion of the total number of seats would require an amendment to Article 81.
The impending delimitation exercise could significantly alter the political representation of India’s northern and southern states. If the number of Lok Sabha seats remains 543, northern states particularly Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, MP, and Rajasthan stand to gain 31 seats, while southern states especially Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh will lose 26 seats. This shift is due to the North’s higher population growth and persistently high fertility rates and could lead to an imbalance in policy priorities.
However, if the total number of Lok Sabha seats is increased to 848 as calculated in a 2019 study the changes become even starker. The four northern states would gain 150 seats while the five in the south would see a net gain of only 35 seats. The disproportionate advantage given to the North would further reduce the South’s influence in national decision-making. This imbalance is particularly concerning because, while the North accounts for only 24 per cent of India’s GDP, the South contributes 31 per cent. A shift in representation without proportional consideration of economic contributions could increase tensions in fiscal federalism.
Article 81 mandates that each Lok Sabha MP should represent between 5 lakh and 7.5 lakh people. But with the constitutional freeze on seat redistribution since 1976, the average population per constituency has significantly increased, with some MPs now representing nearly 30 Lakh people, leading to severe malapportionment. The impact of delimitation becomes further nuanced when considering the number of registered voters per MP. Northern states have higher under-18 populations, and hence a lower proportion of registered voters per constituency compared to their total population. For instance, in Uttar Pradesh, an MP now represents some 31lakh people, whereas in Tamil Nadu, it is only 19.8 lakh. But the difference in actual registered voters per MP is much smaller around 3 lakhs. Many critics argue that the delimitation freeze has weakened the principle of one person, one vote, which assigns equal weight to each citizen’s vote.
The delimitation exercise will also significantly impact the allocation of SC/ST reserved seats in Parliament and state assemblies. Since these seats are allocated in proportion to their population in each state, states with higher SC/ ST growth rates, particularly in the North, could gain more reserved constituencies, while southern states with lower population growth may lose some. According to projections based on the 2011 Census, this could result in a net nationwide increase of two SC-reserved seats and one ST-reserved seat, and at least 18 constituencies witnessing a change in their reservation status. This redistribution could reduce the political influence of SC/ ST communities in states losing seats, triggering opposition from regional leaders.
Stalin has expanded his fight beyond delimitation, framing it as a battle for rights, not just numbers. He sees the three-language policy under the NEP which he calls “Hindi imposition” another example of central overreach, which is already costing Tamil Nadu its rightful funds. The combination of delimitation and the NEP’s language mandate threatens to deepen the North-South divide.
DMK’s renewed focus on the delimitation debate is a strategic move ahead of the Tamil Nadu assembly election, now less than a year away. The BJP has surely handed the DMK a potent campaign issue. The BJP has touched a raw nerve as the new generation of Tamil youth has come to see the DMK and AIADMK as stable governments that deliver on social welfare schemes. The DMK has already capitalised on ideological battles over Hindutva and AIADMK’s association with the BJP, winning three consecutive elections under Stalin, in 2019 and 2024 (LS), and in 2021 (assembly). This time, the BJP leadership has given Stalin another ideological plank on a silver platter: the ‘Dravidian model’ narrative, including Centre-state relations and social justice.
It is evident that the South’s resistance isn’t just about numbers. It is about preserving its political voice, economic contributions and federal autonomy. However, before any redrawing of constituencies can take place, the long-delayed Census must first be conducted. With no official timeline for its completion, the delimitation process remains speculative. Until then, the political rhetoric around it will continue to serve as a flashpoint, shaping poll strategies and deepening regional divides in the run-up to the 2026 Tamil Nadu election.
9438299037
